Bayesian Persuasion by Emir Kamenica & Matthew Gentzkow










We thank Richard Holden for many important contributions to this paper. We would also like to thank
Eric Budish, Navin Kartik, Canice Prendergast, Maxwell Stinchcombe, Lars Stole and participants
at seminars at University of Mannheim, Duke/Northwestern/Texas IO Theory Conference, Stanford
GSB, Simon Fraser University, University of British Columbia, and University of Chicago. This work
is supported by the Initiative on Global Markets, the George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy
and the State, the James S. Kemper Foundation Faculty Research Fund, the Centel Foundation / Robert
P. Reuss Faculty Research Fund, and the Neubauer Family Foundation, all at the University of Chicago
Booth School of Business. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2009 by Emir Kamenica and Matthew Gentzkow. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not
to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including
© notice, is given to the source.Bayesian Persuasion
Emir Kamenica and Matthew Gentzkow




When is it possible for one person to persuade another to change her action? We take a mechanism
design approach to this question. Taking preferences and initial beliefs as given, we introduce the notion
of a persuasion mechanism: a game between Sender and Receiver defined by an information structure
and a message technology. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a persuasion
mechanism that strictly benefits Sender. We characterize the optimal mechanism. Finally, we analyze
several examples that illustrate the applicability of our results.
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Suppose one person, call him Sender, wishes to persuade another, call her Receiver, to change her
action. If Receiver is a rational Bayesian, can Sender persuade her to take an action he would
prefer over the action she was originally going to take? If Receiver understands that Sender chose
what information to convey with the intent of manipulating her action for his own benet, can
Sender still gain from persuasion? If so, what is the optimal way to persuade?
These questions are of substantial economic importance. As McCloskey and Klamer (1995)
emphasize, attempts at persuasion command a sizeable share of our resources. Persuasion, as we
will dene it below, plays an important role in advertising, courts, lobbying, nancial disclosure,
and political campaigns, among many other economic activities.
Consider the example of a prosecutor trying to convince a judge that a defendant is guilty. When
the defendant is indeed guilty, revealing the facts of the case will tend to help the prosecutor's case.
When the defendant is innocent, revealing facts will tend to hurt the prosecutor's case. Can the
prosecutor structure his arguments, selection of evidence, etc. so as to increase the probability of
conviction by a rational judge on average? Perhaps surprisingly, the answer to this question is
yes. Bayes' Law restricts the expectation of posterior beliefs but puts no other constraints on their
distribution. Therefore, so long as the judge's action is not linear in her beliefs, the prosecutor may
benet from persuasion.
To make this concrete, suppose the judge (Receiver) must choose one of two actions: to acquit
or convict a defendant. There are two states of the world: the defendant is either guilty or innocent.
The judge gets utility 1 for choosing the just action (convict when guilty and acquit when innocent)
and utility 0 for choosing the unjust action (convict when innocent and acquit when guilty). The
prosecutor (Sender) gets utility 1 if the judge convicts and utility 0 if the judge acquits, regardless
of the state. The prosecutor and the judge share a prior belief Pr(guilty) = 0:3.
The prosecutor conducts an investigation and is required by law to report its full outcome. We
can think of the choice of the investigation as consisting of the decisions on whom to subpoena, what
forensic tests to conduct, what question to ask an expert witness, etc. We formalize an investigation
as distributions  (jguilty) and  (jinnocent) on some set of signal realizations. The prosecutor
chooses  and must honestly report the signal realization to the judge. Importantly, we assume
2that the prosecutor can choose any  whatsoever, i.e., that the space of possible investigations is
arbitrarily rich.
If there is no communication (or equivalently, if  is completely uninformative), the judge always
acquits because guilt is less likely than innocence under her prior. If the prosecutor chooses a fully
informative investigation, one that leaves no uncertainty about the state, the judge convicts 30
percent of the time. The prosecutor can do better, however. His uniquely optimal investigation
is a binary signal
 (ijinnocent) = 4
7  (ijguilty) = 0
 (gjinnocent) = 3
7  (gjguilty) = 1:
(1)
This leads the judge to convict with probability 60 percent. Note that the judge knows 70 percent
of defendants are innocent, yet she convicts 60 percent of them! She does so even though she is
fully aware that the investigation was designed to maximize the probability of conviction.
In this paper, we study the general problem of persuading a rational agent. Our approach
follows the literature on mechanism design. We consider a setting with an arbitrary state space
and action space, and with arbitrary state-dependent preferences for both Sender and Receiver.
We introduce a broad class of \persuasion mechanisms" that encompasses cheap talk games (e.g.,
Crawford and Sobel 1982), persuasion games (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts 1986), and signalling
games (e.g., Spence 1973), among many others. The key distinguishing feature of a persuasion
mechanism is that Sender can aect Receiver's action only by changing Receiver's beliefs. We do
not allow Sender to make transfers or aect Receiver's payos in any way. In contrast to most
other papers on strategic communication, we allow for mechanisms where Sender can fully commit
on two counts: to fully disclose all he knows and to limit the extent of his private information.
Given this denition, we focus on two questions: (i) when does there exist a persuasion mechanism
that strictly benets Sender, and (ii) what is an optimal mechanism from Sender's perspective?
We begin by establishing some results that simplify our analysis. We show that, without loss
of generality, we can restrict attention to mechanisms where Sender learns a recommended action
for Receiver, reports it truthfully, and then Receiver chooses the recommended action. In the
example above, we can think of i as a recommendation to acquit and g as a recommendation to
convict. We then show that we can re-express the problem of choosing such a mechanism as a
3search over distributions of posteriors subject to the constraint that the expected posterior is equal
to the prior.
When does there exist a persuasion mechanism that strictly benets Sender? Consider why the
prosecutor in the example benets from the opportunity to provide information to the judge. Since
the judge is rational, providing information must sometimes make her more convinced and some-
times less convinced that the defendant is guilty. The former will strictly improve the prosecutor's
payo if the information is strong enough to induce conviction. The latter, however, will not reduce
the prosecutor's payo, since the judge already acquits the defendant by default. The net eect is
to increase the prosecutor's payo in expectation. We show that in general Sender benets from
persuasion whenever (i) Receiver does not take Sender's preferred action by default (in a sense we
make precise below) and (ii) Receiver's action is constant in some neighborhood of beliefs around
the prior. When these conditions hold, Sender can benet by sending a signal that induces a better
action with positive probability and balances this with a worse belief that leaves Receiver's action
unchanged. We also show that whether Sender benets from persuasion depends in a natural way
on the concavity or convexity of Sender's payo as a function of Receiver's beliefs.
We next turn to studying optimal mechanisms. We use tools from convex analysis to show
that an optimal mechanism exists and to characterize it for any given set of preferences and initial
beliefs. We show that no disclosure of information is optimal when Sender's payo is concave in
Receiver's beliefs, and full disclosure is optimal when Sender's payo is convex in Receiver's beliefs.
We also establish that an optimal mechanism need never induce more actions in equilibrium than
there are states.
We then generalize three important properties of the optimal mechanism in the example above.
Notice, rst, that when the judge chooses the prosecutor's least-preferred action (acquit), she
is certain of the state. That is, she never acquits guilty defendants. Otherwise, we would have
 (ijguilty) > 0. But then the prosecutor could increase his payo by decreasing  (ijguilty) and
increasing  (gjguilty); this would strictly increase the probability of g and would only increase
the willingness of the judge to convict when she sees g. We establish that, in general, whenever
Receiver takes Sender's least-preferred action, she knows with certainty that the state is one where
this action is optimal.
4Second, notice that when the judge convicts, she is exactly indierent between convicting and
acquitting. If she strictly preferred to convict upon seeing g, the prosecutor could increase his
payo by slightly decreasing  (ijinnocent) and increasing  (gjinnocent); this would increase the
probability of g and leave the judge's optimal action given the message unchanged, thus increasing
the probability of conviction. We show that, in general, whenever Receiver has an interior posterior,
she is eectively indierent among two actions.
Finally, notice that because the prosecutor's payo is (weakly) increasing in the judge's posterior
belief that the state is guilty, it is meaningful to talk about beliefs that place more weight on
innocent as being \worse" from the prosecutor's perspective. A dierent way to look at the last
two results is that the prosecutor chooses an investigation that induces the worst possible belief
consistent with a given action by the judge|certainty of innocence when the action is acquit,
and indierence when the action is convict. We show that in general when Sender's payos are
monotonic in Receiver's beliefs, Sender typically induces the worst belief consistent with a given
action.
We next apply our results to three examples. Our rst example examines what type of feedback
a university should provide to an assistant professor whose research eort depends on her beliefs
about the chance that she will get tenure. The second example studies how preference disagree-
ment between Sender and Receiver impacts information transmission under an optimal mechanism.
Lastly, we analyze the optimal structure of informative advertisements in a setting with unit de-
mand. These examples illustrate both the breadth of situations captured by our model and the
practical applicability of our propositions. Finally, we discuss extensions of our results to dynamic
mechanisms, incomplete information on the part of Receiver, multiple Receivers, multiple Senders,
limited messaging technologies, and limited commitment.
The observation that Bayesian updating only restricts the expectation of posteriors has been
made before and has been utilized in a variety of contexts.1 The work most closely related to our
1The formal methods employed in our analysis are very close to Aumann and Maschler's (1995) analysis of repeated
games of incomplete information. They study the value to a player of knowing which game is being played when the
other player lacks this knowledge, a xed zero-sum game is repeated ad innitum, players maximize their long-run
non-discounted average payos, and payos are not observed. The fact that the informed player's initial actions have
no impact on his long-run average payos (and can thus be treated as just a signal) combined with a focus on Nash
equilibria (which implicitly allow for commitment) makes Aumann and Maschler's problem mathematically analogous
to ours. More recently, the same approach has been used to study when it is optimal for leaders to instigate a war
(Goemans and Fay 2009).
5paper is Brocas and Carrillo (2007). They analyze the gain to Sender from controlling the ow of
public information in a setting with a binary state space and information that consists of a sequence
of symmetric binary signals. Lewis and Sappington (1994) and Johnson and Myatt (2006) consider
how much information a monopolist would want to provide to his potential customers. Carillo and
Mariotti (2000), Bodner and Prelec (2003), and B enabou and Tirole (2002, 2003, 2004) employ
a form of Bayesian persuasion to study self-signaling and self-regulation. Caillaud and Tirole
(2007) rely on a similar mechanism to study persuasion in group settings. Lazear (2006) applies
a closely-related intuition to examine when providing information about a test increases learning.
In contrast to these papers, we derive results that apply to arbitrary state spaces, information
structures, preferences and initial beliefs.2
This paper also relates to a broader literature on optimal information structures. Prendergast
(1992) studies the assignment of individuals into groups (and the resulting information about their
types) when individuals are risk-averse over the realization of their type. Ostrovsky and Schwarz
(2008) examine the equilibrium design of grade transcripts (and the resulting information about
quality of students) when schools compete to place their students in good jobs. H orner and
Skrzypacz (2009) demonstate how revelation of partially informative signals can increase payments
to a Sender who is trying to sell his information to Receiver. Rayo and Segal's (2008) concurrent
work characterizes the optimal disclosure policy under specic assumptions about preferences and
about Receiver's outside option.
Our results also contribute to the literature on contract theory. An important aspect of our
setting is that Receiver's action is not contractible. Most work in contract theory examines two
remedies for such non-contractibility: payment for outcomes correlated with the action (e.g., Holm-
strom 1979, Grossman and Hart 1983) and suitable allocation of property rights (e.g., Grossman
and Hart 1986, Hart and Moore 1990). Our results highlight another instrument for implementing
a second-best outcome, namely the control of the agent's informational environment.3 Our example
on how to optimally structure midterm review of tenure-track faculty so as to induce second-best
eort illustrates this interpetation of our results.
2Glazer and Rubinstein (2004, 2006) study related problems where the communication technology eectively limits
the set of signals Sender can convey. They focus on Receiver's part of the problem, however, and their approach
diers markedly from that in all of the aforementioned papers.
3Taub (1997) analyzes the impact of information provision on incentives in a dynamic framework.
6Finally, past work has studied related questions in contexts where Receivers are not perfect
Bayesians (Mullainathan, Schwartzstein, and Shleifer 2008, Ettinger and Jehiel forthcoming)4.
While persuasive activities may reect such failures of rationality, assessing the relevant evidence
requires a more complete understanding of when and how persuading a fully rational Bayesian is
possible.
2 A model of persuasion
Receiver has a continuous utility function u(a;!) that depends on her action a 2 A and the state
of the world ! 2 
. Sender has a continuous utility function v (a;!) that depends on Receiver's
action and the state of the world. Sender and Receiver share a prior 0 2 int((
)).5 Let
a () to be the set of actions that maximize Receiver's expected utility given her belief is . We
assume that that there are at least two actions in A and that for any action a there exists a  s.t.
a () = fag. The action space A is compact and the state space 
 is nite. The latter assumption
is mainly for ease of exposition: Appendix B demonstrates that our central characterization result
extends to the case where 
 is any compact metric space.
A special case of particular interest is where ! is a real-valued random variable, Receiver's
action depends only on the expectation E [!], rather than the entire distribution , and Sender's
preferences over Receiver's actions do not depend on !. This holds, for example, if u(a;!) =
 (a   !)
2 and v (a;!) = a. When these conditions are satised, we will say that payos depend
only on the expected state.
We dene a persuasion mechanism (;c) to be a combination of a signal and a message technol-
ogy. Sender's private signal  consists of a nite realization space S and a family of distributions
f (j!)g!2
 over S. A message technology c consists of a nite message space M and a family of
functions c(js) : M ! R+ ; c(mjs) denotes the cost to Sender of sending message m after receiving
signal realization s.6 The assumptions that S and M are nite are without loss of generality (cf.
Proposition 9) and are used solely for notational convenience.
4Cain, Loewenstein, and Moore (2005) provide experimental results on irrational susceptibility to persuasion.
5int(X) denotes the interior of set X and (X) the set of all probability distributions on X.
6R+ denotes the anely extended non-negative real numbers: R+ = R+ [ f1g. Allowing c to take on the value
of 1 is useful for characterizing the cases where Sender cannot lie and cases where he must reveal all his information.
7A persuasion mechanism denes a game. The timing is as follows. First, nature selects ! from

 according to 0. Neither Sender nor Receiver observe nature's move. Then, Sender privately
observes a realization s 2 S from  (j!) and chooses a message m 2 M. Finally, Receiver observes
m and chooses an action a 2 A. Sender's payo is v (a;!) c(mjs) and Receiver's payo is u(a;!).
We represent the Sender's and Receiver's (possibly stochastic) strategies by  and , respectively.
We use (!jm) to denote Receiver's posterior belief that the state is ! after observing m.
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a persuasion mechanism is a triplet (;;) satisfying the
usual conditions. We also apply an additional equilibrium selection criterion: we focus on Sender-
preferred equilibria, i.e., equilibria where the expectation of v (a;!)   c(mjs) is the greatest. The
focus on Sender-preferred equilibria provides a consistent comparison across mechanisms which
prevents us from generating benets of persuasion simply through equilibrium selection. Moreover,
this particular comparison, unlike say comparing equilibria worst for Sender, ensures the existence
of an optimal mechanism (cf. proof of Proposition 7). In the remainder of the paper, we use the term
\equilibrium" to mean a Sender-preferred perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a persuasion mechanism.
Motivated by this denition of equilibria, we let ^ a() denote an element of a () that maximizes
Sender's expected utility at belief . If there is more than one such action, we let ^ a() be an
arbitrary element from this set.7 We refer to ^ a(0), as the default action.
We dene the value of a mechanism to be the equilibrium expectation of v (a;!)   c(mjs).
The gain from a mechanism is the dierence between its value and the equilibrium expectation
of v (a;!) when Receiver obtains no information. Sender benets from persuasion if there is a
mechanism with a strictly positive gain. A mechanism is optimal if no other mechanism has higher
value.
2.1 Varieties of Persuasion Mechanisms
A few examples help clarify the varieties of games that are captured by the denition of a persuasion
mechanism. If  is perfectly informative and c is constant, the mechanism is a cheap talk game as
in Crawford and Sobel (1982). If  is arbitrary and c is constant, the mechanism coincides with
the information-transmission game of Green and Stokey (2007). If  is perfectly informative and
7This allows us to use convenient notation such as v (^ a();!).
8c(mjs) =  (m   s)
2, the mechanism is a communication game with lying costs developed in Kartik
(forthcoming). If  is perfectly informative, M = P (
), and c(mjs) =
 0 if s2m
1 if s= 2m, the mechanism
is a persuasion game as in Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981).8 If  is perfectly informative,
M = R+, and c(mjs) = m=s, the mechanism is Spence's (1973) education signalling game. The
model can also be easily re-interpreted to allow for multiple receivers (as in Lewis and Sappington
1994), for Seller to have discretion over which costly information to acquire (Jovanovic 1982), or
for Receiver to be uncertain about Sender's information (Shin 2003) or preferences (Dziuda 2009).
We consider extensions to our model in Section 7 below, where we also discuss in more detail what
types of games our denition rules out.
2.2 Honest Mechanisms
A particularly important type of a persuasion mechanism is one where M = S and c(mjs) =
 k if s=m
1 if s6=m for some k 2 R+. We call such mechanisms honest. In contrast to Grossman (1981)
and Milgrom (1981), where Sender is simply not allowed to tell an explicit lie, under an honest
mechanism Sender must tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. In other words,
he has committed to fully disclose all his private information. Much of our analysis depends on
allowing for the possibility that Sender can commit in this way.
Note that an honest mechanism can be interpreted as either (i) a choice of a signal  on S given
an honest messaging technology c(mjs) =
 k if s=m
1 if s6=m, or (ii) a disclosure rule  : 
 ! (S), as in
Rayo and Segal (2008). While these two interpretations are formally equivalent, one or the other
may be more natural in particular settings.
Examples where the rst interpretation makes sense include a prosecutor requesting a forensic
test or a rm conducting a public celebrity taste test against a rival product. In these settings,
Sender has an ability to commit on two counts: he can choose to remain imperfectly informed
and he can commit to fully disclose anything he learns. The latter commitment may arise either
because Receiver directly observes the revelation of the information (as in the taste test example)
or through an institutional structure that requires Sender to always report all the tests he has
conducted and what their outcomes were (as in the prosecutor example).
8P (X) denotes the set of all subsets of X.
9Examples where the second interpretation is more natural include a school or a rating agency
choosing a coarse grading policy. Here, Sender might be unable to avoid learning the full information
about the state but can plausibly commit to an ex ante, potentially stochastic, disclosure rule that
is not fully revealing.
3 Simplifying the Problem
The class of persuasion mechanisms dened above is large, including cases where Sender's strategy
might involve complex messages, signaling, lying, and so on. In this section, we show that to
determine whether Sender benets from persuasion and what an optimal mechanism is, it suces
to consider a much simpler problem.
The key intuition is the following. An equilibrium of any persuasion mechanism induces
a particular distribution of Receiver's beliefs. This distribution of beliefs in turn determines a
distribution over Receiver's actions. From Sender's perspective, any equilibrium that induces the
same distribution of actions conditional on states must have the same value. To determine whether
there exists a persuasion mechanism with some given value, therefore, it is sucient to ask whether
there exists a distribution of Receiver's beliefs that is compatible with Bayes' rule and generates
expected utility for Sender equal to that value.
Let a distribution of posteriors  be a distribution on (
). A persuasion mechanism induces
 if there exists an equilibrium of the mechanism such that Supp() = fmgm2M and
(i) m () =  (jm)






 (mjs) (sj!)0 (!).
A belief  is induced by a mechanism if  is induced by the mechanism and  () > 0. A distribution
of posteriors is Bayes-plausible if the expected posterior probability of each state equals its prior
probability:
Z
d () = 0.
Bayesian rationality requires that any equilibrium distribution of Receiver's beliefs be Bayes-
10plausible. Our rst Proposition below shows that this is the only restriction imposed by Bayesian
rationality. That is, for any Bayes-plausible distribution of posteriors there is a persuasion mecha-
nism that induces this distribution in equilibrium.9
Now, let





This denotes Sender's expected utility when both he and Receiver hold belief .
Sender's utility (gross of messaging costs) in any mechanism which induces  is simply the
expectation of ^ v under , E^ v (). At terminal nodes of the game, Sender and Receiver may hold
dierent beliefs, say S and R. For example, Sender may have observed a highly informative signal
but chosen to send a message that reveals no information. Sender's payo at such a node is neither
^ v (S) nor ^ v (R), but rather
P
!2
 v (^ a(R);!)S (!). A more obvious statement, then, would
have been that the Sender's utility in a mechanism is the expectation of
P
!2
 v (^ a(R);!)S (!)
over the joint distribution of Sender's and Receiver's beliefs. What allows us to collapse this
potentially complicated expression to E^ v () is the following observation. Because Receiver's
beliefs satisfy the equilibrium condition, it must be the case that from the ex ante perspective,
before he has obtained any private information, Sender's belief conditional on learning that Receiver
will have belief  must also be . Hence, his ex ante expected utility from inducing  is ^ v ().
Another reason why we do not need to worry about the joint distribution of Sender's and Re-
ceiver's beliefs is that we can restrict our attention, without loss of generality, to honest mechanisms
where Sender's and Receiver's beliefs always coincide. In fact, we can restrict our attention even
further, to a particular type of honest mechanism. Say that a mechanism is straightforward if it is
honest, S  A, and Receiver's equilibrium action equals the message. In other words, in straight-
forward mechanisms, the signal produces a \recommended action" for Receiver, Sender reports the
recommendation honestly, and Receiver takes the action recommended. Given a distribution of
actions induced by any mechanism, there exists a straightforward mechanism that induces the same
distribution of actions. This result is closely analogous to the revelation principle (e.g., Myerson
1979). Of course, the revelation principle applies to problems where players' information is a given,
9Ganuza and Penalva (2009) also utilize the isomorphism between signals and distributions of posteriors to intro-
duce orders on the space of signals based on the dispersion of the distribution of posteriors they induce.
11while our problem is that of designing the informational environment.
This leads us to the proposition that greatly simplies our problem.
Proposition 1 The following are equivalent:
1. There exists a persuasion mechanism with value v;
2. There exists a straightforward mechanism with value v;
3. There exists a Bayes-plausible distribution of posteriors  such that E^ v () = v.
Detailed proofs of all propositions are in Appendix A. We sketch the basic argument here. That
(2) implies (1) and (3) is immediate. To see that (1) implies (2), let (j!) be the distribution
of actions in an equilibrium of any mechanism. Consider the honest mechanism with S = A
and  (aj!) = (aj!). We need to show that in an equilibrium of this mechanism  (ajm) =
1 if a=m
0 if a6=m. This follows from two observations: (i) the belief induced by sending message a is a
convex combination of beliefs that induced a in the original equilibrium; (ii) if an action is optimal
for a set of beliefs, it is optimal for a belief that is in the convex hull of that set. Finally, that
(3) implies (1) is equivalent to the claim that Bayes-plausability is the only restriction on the
equilibrium distribution of posteriors. This part of our argument is closely related to Shmaya
and Yariv's (2009) concurrent work that identies which sequences of distributions of posteriors
are consistent with Bayesian rationality. Given any Bayes-plausible , let S index Supp() and
consider a signal  (sj!) =
s(!)(s)
0(!) . The honest mechanism with signal  induces .
The key implication of Proposition 1 is that to evaluate whether Sender benets from persuasion
and to determine the value of an optimal mechanism we need only ask how E^ v () varies over the
space of Bayes-plausible distributions of posteriors.
Corollary 1 Sender benets from persuasion if and only if there exists a Bayes-plausible distribu-
tion of posteriors such that
E^ v () > ^ v (0).






d () = 0.
Note that Corollary 1 does not by itself tell us that an optimal mechanism exists. As we will
show later, however, this is indeed always the case.
Proposition 1 implies that we can restrict our attention to mechanisms where Sender is com-
pelled to report all he knows truthfully. Consequently, none of our results depend on the inter-
pretation of v as Sender's utility. We could let v denote a social welfare function, for example.
Our results would then identify socially-optimal rather than Sender-optimal mechanisms. Or, we
could let v denote a weighted combination of Sender's and Receiver's utilities resulting from ex
ante bargaining over which mechanism to use. Throughout the paper we will refer to v as Sender's
utility, but one should keep in mind that our results apply for any objective function over Receiver's
action and the state.
We introduce a nal denition that will be useful in the analysis that follows. Let V be the
concave closure of ^ v:
V ()  supfzj(;z) 2 co(^ v)g;
where co(^ v) denotes the convex hull of the graph of ^ v. Note that V is concave by construction.
In fact, it is the smallest concave function which is everywhere weakly greater than ^ v.10 Figure 1
shows an example of the construction of V . In this gure, as in all gures in the paper, we
identify a distribution  with a point in Rn 1, where n is the number of states. So in Figure 1, if

 = f!L;!Rg, the  on the x-axis is the probability of one of the states, say !L. Specifying this
probability of course uniquely pins down the distribution :
10Our denition of concave closure is closely related to the notion of a biconjugate function in convex analysis
(Hiriart-Urruty and Lemar echal 2004). Note that we can alternatively express V as










where h;i denotes inner product. Hence, V is a \concave version" of the (convex) biconjugate function dened by
^ v











Specically, V =  (( ^ v)









Figure 1: an illustration of concave closure
To see why V is a useful construct, observe that if (0;z) 2 co(^ v), then there exists a distribution
of posteriors  such that E = 0 and E^ v () = z. Thus, by Proposition 1, co(^ v) is the set of
(;z) such that if the prior is , there exists a mechanism with value z. Hence, V () is the largest
payo Sender can achieve with any mechanism when the prior is .
Corollary 2 The value of an optimal mechanism is V (0). Sender benets from persuasion if
and only if V (0) > ^ v (0).
Figure 2 shows the function ^ v, the optimal mechanism, and the concave closure V in the
motivating example from the introduction. In the gure,  denotes the probability that the state
is guilty. As panel (a) shows, ^ v is a step function: the prosecutor's expected payo is 0 whenever 
is less than 0:5 (since the judge will choose acquit) and 1 whenever  is greater than or equal to :5
(since the judge will choose convict). As panel (b) shows, the optimal signal induces two posterior
beliefs. When the judge observes i, her posterior belief is  = 0 and ^ v (0) = 0. When the judge
observes g, her posterior belief is  = :5 and ^ v (:5) = 1. The distribution  over these beliefs places
probability :4 on  = 0 and probability :6 on  = :5. Hence, the prosecutor's expected utility is
E^ v () = :6. The distribution  is Bayes plausible since 0 = :3 = :4(0) + :6(:5). As panel (c)
shows, the concave closure V is equal to 2 when   0:5 and constant at 1 when  > 0:5. It is



























Figure 2: the motivating example
4 When does Sender benet from persuasion?
Corollary 2 provides a necessary and sucient condition for Sender to benet from persuasion
in terms of the concave closure V . In any problem where we can graph the function ^ v, it is
straightforward to construct V and determine the prior beliefs, if any, at which V (0) > ^ v (0). In
Figure 3, for example Sender benets from persuasion for any 0 2 (l;h), and does not benet
from persuasion for any 0  l or 0  h. In Figure 2, Sender benets from persuasion for any
0 2 (0;:5)|i.e. at any prior belief at which the judge does not convict by default. In this section,
we characterize the conditions when V (0) > ^ v (0) holds, rst in terms of the properties of ^ v; and
then in terms of the primitives of our model, namely Sender and Receiver's preferences and initial
beliefs.
Corollaries 1 and 2 tell us that Sender benets from persuasion if and only if there exists a 
such that E (^ v ()) > ^ v (E ()): Whether this is the case is naturally tied to the concavity or
convexity of ^ v. Note that since ^ v is not necessarily dierentiable, we cannot speak of its convexity
or concavity \at a point." The analogue for a potentially non-dierentiable function to being
weakly convex everywhere and strictly convex somewhere is that it be convex and not concave.
Proposition 2 If ^ v is concave, Sender does not benet from persuasion for any prior. If ^ v is










Figure 3: an illustration with an arbitrary ^ v
Observe that in the simple case where Sender's payo does not depend on the state, ^ v () =
v (^ a()). The concavity or convexity of ^ v then depends on just two things: whether Receiver's
action ^ a() is concave or convex in , and whether Sender's payo v (a) is concave or convex in a.
If both ^ a and v are concave, Sender does not benet from persuasion. If both ^ a and v are convex
and at least one of them is not concave, Sender benets from persuasion.
Consider a simple example where u(a;!) =  (a   !)
2 and v (a;!) = a. In this case, both
^ a and v are linear, and hence concave, so Sender does not benet from persuasion. Moreover,
since ^ v () = E [!] is linear in , Sender is completely indierent about the information Receiver
obtains. This is not because he does not care about Receiver's belief: his utility is strictly increasing
in the expectation of . Rather, it is because he knows that in any informational environment,
Receiver's beliefs will on average equal the prior, so his expected utility from Receiver's action is
xed at E0 [!].11
There is also a sense in which the concavity or convexity of ^ v depends on the extent to which
Sender and Receiver's preferences are aligned. At one extreme, if Sender and Receiver's preferences
are perfectly aligned (v = u), we have ^ v ()  maxa
P
! u(a;!)(!): Since the maximand is linear
in , ^ v is convex. Moreover, since ^ a() is not constant, ^ v is not concave. Hence, Sender benets
11This does not mean Sender is indierent across all mechanisms. Some mechanisms, such as a signalling game,
would induce messaging costs in equilibrium and thus lead to a lower overall utility.
16from persuasion. By the same logic, if Sender and Receiver's preferences are perfectly misaligned
(v =  u), ^ v is concave and Sender can never benet from persuasion. In Subsection 6.2, we explore
alignment of preferences in more detail.
Often, ^ v will be neither convex nor concave. This is true, for example, in our motivating example
as shown in Figure 2. As we discussed earlier, the fact that Sender benets from persuasion in
that example hinges on (i) the fact that Receiver does not take Sender's preferred action by default,
and (ii) the fact that Receiver's action is constant in a neighborhood around the prior. We now
show that these two conditions, suitably generalized, play a crucial role more broadly. Specically,
the generalization of (i) is necessary, while generalizations of (i) and (ii) are jointly sucient, for
Sender to benet from persuasion.
To generalize (i), say there is information Sender would share if 9 s.t.
^ v () >
X
!
v (^ a(0);!)(!): (2)
In other words, there must exist a  such that, if Sender had private information that led him to
believe , he would prefer to share this information with Receiver rather than have Receiver act
based on 0. Note that when v does not depend on !, there is information Sender would share as
long the default action is not dominant, i.e., v (^ a(0)) < v (a) for some a 2 A. This is the sense in
which equation (2) generalizes condition (i).
When there is no information Sender would share, Sender cannot benet from persuasion since
there is no informative message he would ever wish Receiver to see.
Proposition 3 If there is no information Sender would share, Sender does not benet from per-
suasion.
Now, to generalize (ii), we say Receiver's preference is discrete at belief  if Receiver's expected
utility from her preferred action ^ a() is bounded away from her expected utility from any other





17The following Proposition is the main result of this section; it demonstrates that the general-
izations of (i) and (ii) are sucient for Sender to benet from persuasion.
Proposition 4 If there is information Sender would share and Receiver's preference is discrete at
the prior, Sender benets from persuasion.
The intuition for the proof is as follows. First, because there is information that Sender would
share we can nd a belief h such that ^ v (h) >
P
!
v (^ a(0);!)h (!). Second, the discreteness of
Receiver's preference implies that there is a belief near the prior, say l, such that ^ a(l) is equal to
Receiver's default action and 0 is on the segment between l and h. That mixing point l and
h produces a strictly positive gain is obvious in a case like the motivating example where Sender's
payo v does not depend on the state. The argument is more subtle when v does depend on the




v (^ a(0);!)(!) is linear in . This implies that mixing l with h yields a
strictly positive gain.
Proposition 4 is particularly useful when the action space is nite. In that case, Receiver's
preference is generically discrete at the prior in the sense that the set of beliefs at which Receiver's
preference is not discrete is Lebesgue measure-zero in (
). To see why this is the case, note
that with a nite action space, Receiver's preference can be non-discrete at  only if Receiver is
exactly indierent between two distinct actions at . Such indierence is a knife-edge case that
generically does not hold at the prior.
Proposition 5 If A is nite, Receiver's preference is discrete at the prior generically.
The key implication of Proposition 5 is that when the action space is nite, we should expect
Sender to benet from persuasion if and only if there is information Sender would share. Note,
however, that this result is not meant to suggest that there is some form of discontinuity in Sender's
benet from persuasion as we move from large nite choice sets to innite ones. As the action space
becomes large, the gain from persuasion may become arbitrarily small.
We now turn to the case where payos depend only on the expected state. We have shown
that when ^ v can be graphed, inspection of the graph can show directly whether Sender benets
18from persuasion. Remember, however, that the domain of ^ v is (
). This means that it is only
possible to easily depict ^ v when there are two or three states. When there are more states, our
Propositions still apply, but one cannot approach the problem by simply studying the graph of ^ v.
When payos depend only on the expected state, however, a natural conjecture is that we could
learn about Sender's gain from persuasion by graphing Sender's expected payo as a function of
the expected state E [!] rather than as a function of  directly. If so, we would have a simple
two-dimensional representation of this subclass of problems regardless of the size of the state space.
When payos depend only on the expected state, there exists a e v : R ! R such that e v (E [!]) =
^ v (). Let e V be the concave closure of e v. The following proposition shows that the conjecture above
is correct: we can determine whether Sender benets from persuasion simply by inspecting ~ V and
~ v. In Section 6 below, we provide an example of how this result can greatly simplify the analysis
of problems with a large state space.

















implies Sender cannot benet from persuasion, we need
only note that for any Bayes-plausible ,













, we know there is a  s.t.
E [E [!]] = E0 [!] and E [^ v ()] > ^ v (0). If this  were Bayes-plausible, we could construct an
honest mechanism that induces it and we would be done. The trouble is that E [E [!]] = E0 [!]
does not guarantee that  is Bayes-plausible. To construct a persuasion mechanism with a strictly
positive gain, we show that it is always possible to nd a belief 0 such that E0 [!] = E0 [!] and
a Bayes-plausible 0 that is a mixture of  and 0. Since E [^ v ()] > ^ v (0) and ^ v (0) = ^ v (0), we
know that E0 [^ v ()] > ^ v (0).12
12As the detailed proof in Appendix A shows, we can also establish a result somewhat stronger than Proposition
6. Suppose there exists a linear T : (
) ! R
k and a e v : R
k ! R s.t. ^ v () = e v (T). Then, Sender benets from
persuasion if and only if e v is below its concave closure at T0. We focus on the case where T = E [!] only so we
can simplify the exposition of the result.
195 Optimal mechanisms
Corollary 2 shows that the value of an optimal mechanism is V (0). When the problem is simple
enough that it is possible to graph ^ v and V , we can read V (0) and the gain V (0)   ^ v (0) o
the graph directly. Figure 3 illustrates this for the arbitrary ^ v shown earlier in Figure 1. Similarly,
in Figure 2, we can easily see that the value of the optimal mechanism in our motivating example
must be V (0) = :6, and the gain is V (0)   ^ v (0) = :6   0 = :6.
The graph of ^ v and V also identies the beliefs induced by the optimal mechanism|these are
the points on ^ v whose convex combination yields value V (0). In Figure 3, we see that the optimal
mechanism induces beliefs l and h. It is clear from this gure that the optimal mechanism is
unique, since there are no beliefs other than l and h that could be combined to produce value
V (0). Similarly, we can easily see in Figure 2 that the optimal mechanism must induce beliefs
 = 0 and  = :5.
From here, it is straightforward to construct the optimal mechanism. The condition that
R
d () = 0 allows us to compute the distribution . For the motivating example in Fig-
ure 2, we must have 0 (0) + :5 (:5) = :3, so  (0) = :4 and  (:5) = :6. Following the proof of






0 if s = m
1 if s 6= m
:
For the motivating example, this yields the  in Equation 1.
These steps rely on being able to visualize the graphs of ^ v and V , which is only possible when
the number of states is small. More generally, ^ v is upper semicontinuous13, which implies that any
element of the graph of V can be expressed as a convex combination of elements of the graph of ^ v.14
In particular, there exists a Bayes-plausible distribution of posteriors  such that E^ v () = V (0).
From  and the prior 0, we can construct  (sj!) and c(mjs) from the expressions above. Then,
(;c) is an optimal mechanism.
13This is a consequence of our focus on Sender-preferred equilibria. We show this in Lemma 2.
14We establish this implication in Lemma 4.
20Thus:
Proposition 7 An optimal mechanism exists.
We rst characterize the optimal mechanism in terms of the convexity or concavity of ^ v. Say
that no disclosure is optimal if  (jm) = 0 for all m sent in equilibrium of an optimal mechanism.15
If, at the other extreme,  (jm) is degenerate for all m sent in equilibrium of an optimal mechanism,
say that full disclosure is optimal.16 Finally, if  (jm) is at the boundary of (
) for all m sent
in equilibrium of an optimal mechanism, we say that strong disclosure is optimal.
Proposition 8 For any prior,
 if ^ v is (strictly) concave, no disclosure is (uniquely) optimal;
 if ^ v is (strictly) convex, full disclosure is (uniquely) optimal;
 if ^ v is convex and not concave, strong disclosure is uniquely optimal.
The rst two parts of Proposition 8 follow directly from the denition of convexity and concavity.
To see why the third part holds, rst note that for any  induced by an optimal mechanism, it
must be the case that V () = ^ v (). This observation will also be quite useful for several other
Propositions. Now, if ^ v is not concave, there is some belief l s.t. V (l) > ^ v (l). If an optimal
mechanism induces an interior belief, this belief can be expressed as a convex combination of l
and some other belief. But then, V () = ^ v () and V (l) > ^ v (l) coupled with concavity of V
imply that ^ v cannot be convex.
Next, we show that in an optimal mechanism, the number of actions Sender needs to induce in
equilibrium is limited by the number of states.17
Proposition 9 There exists an optimal straightforward mechanism in which the number of actions
Receiver takes with positive probability in equilibrium is at most j
j:
15Note that in contrast to Sender, who can be hurt by revelation of information, Receiver is always made weakly
better o by any mechanism.
16We say  is degenerate if there is an ! s.t. (!) = 1.
17In fact, as the proof of the proposition shows, we establish a somewhat stronger result: there exists an optimal
straightforward mechanism that induces a  whose support has cardinality no greater than that of 
.
21Note, rst, that this proposition is clearly true for our motivating example, where there are two
states and the optimal mechanism induces exactly two actions. It is also true for the example of
Figure 3, where there are also two states and the optimal signal induces two beliefs l and h; since
we have assumed no belief induces more than one action in equilibrium, the optimal mechanism
induces no more than two actions.
Formally, the proof of Proposition 9 hinges on showing that any point on the graph of V can
be written as a convex combination of at most j
j points on the graph of ^ v. This is closely related
to Caratheodory's theorem, which shows that if a point p is in the convex hull of a set of points P
in RN , it is possible to write p as a convex combination of N +1 or fewer of the points in P. This
would be sucient to prove a version of Proposition 9 where the bound is j
j + 1 rather than j
j.
To prove that only j
j points are required, we rely on a related result from convex analysis.18
The intuition for Proposition 9 is best seen graphically. Referring back to Figure 3, it is easy
to see that when there are two states, V will always be made up of points on ^ v and line segments
whose endpoints are on ^ v. This means we can write any point on the graph of V as a convex
combination of at most two points of the graph of ^ v. More generally, V will always be made up of
points on ^ v and the (j
j   1)-dimensional faces whose vertices are on ^ v. Any point on such a face
can be written as a convex combination of at most j
j points of ^ v.
The bound provided by Proposition 9 is tight - one can easily construct examples where the
optimal mechanism cannot be achieved with a signal that has fewer than j
j possible realizations.
For instance, whenever full disclosure is uniquely optimal, no mechanism with jSj < j
j can be
optimal. It is also worthwhile to note that this is a property specically of optimal mechanisms.
One can construct an example in which there exists a mechanism with value v but there is no
mechanism with j
j or fewer actions induced in equilibrium that also gives value v. Proposition
9, however, implies that such a v must be strictly less than the value of an optimal mechanism.
We now turn to generalizing three features of the optimal mechanism in our motivating example:
(i) whenever the judge chooses the prosecutor's least-preferred action (acquit), the judge is certain
of the state; (ii) whenever the judge chooses an action that is not the prosecutor's least-preferred
18Caratheodory's Theorem guarantees that given any mechanism with value v
 (optimal or otherwise), there is a
mechanism that induces no more than j
j + 1 actions which also yields v
. Fenchel and Bunt's strengthening of
Caratheodory's theorem implies that given an optimal mechanism, we need no more than j
j actions.
22(convict), she is indierent between that action and a worse one; (iii) the prosecutor always induces
the worst belief consistent with a given action by the judge.
To generalize (i), we show that if there exists an action a which is Sender's least-preferred
regardless of the state, then at any  induced by an optimal mechanism that leads Receiver to
choose a, Receiver is certain that a is her optimal action.
Proposition 10 Suppose that v (a;!) < v (a;!) for all ! and all a 6= a. Suppose that  is induced
by an optimal mechanism and ^ a() = a. Then, for any ! s.t. fag 6= argmaxu(a;!), we have
(!) = 0.
Intuitively, suppose that in a straightforward mechanism there is a belief which induces a but
puts positive probability on a state ! where a is not optimal. For this to be true, Sender must
report message a with positive probability in state !. Sender's payo would be strictly higher in
a mechanism that simply revealed that the true state is ! in all such cases, because this would
induce Receiver to choose an action Sender likes strictly better than a and would leave Receiver's
actions given all other messages unchanged.
To generalize (ii), we establish that at any interior  induced by an optimal mechanism,
Receiver's preference for ^ a() cannot be discrete. To show this result, it is necessary to rule out
a pathological case where there can be a default action such that there is no information Sender
would share, yet there is some other action which yields exactly the same utility to Sender as the
default action.
Assumption 1 There exists no action a s.t. (i) 8, ^ v () 
P
!
v (a;!)(!) and (ii) 9 s.t.




Since this assumption rules out only a particular type of indierence, we conjecture the set of
Sender's and Receiver's preferences that violate Assumption 1 has Lebesgue measure zero.
Proposition 11 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. If Sender benets from persuasion, Receiver's
preference is not discrete at any interior  induced by an optimal mechanism.
For an intuition for this result, note that if Receiver's preference at  were discrete, then if 
were the prior Sender could benet from persuasion unless there was no information Sender would
23share (by Proposition 4). So, since we know V () = ^ v (), it must be the case that if  were
the prior, there would be no information Sender would share. That would mean that ^ a() is an
extremely desirable action for Sender, so he would want to maximize the chance of inducing it.
But, if  were discrete, there would be another belief, close to , which would yield the same action
and which Sender could induce more often than . Hence the Proposition above must hold.
The fact that Receiver's preference at  is not discrete means that, in at least one direction,
Receiver's action changes at . Note that Sender must weakly dislike at least one such change;
otherwise he would be better o providing more information. Moreover, when the action space is
nite, Proposition 11 implies that at any interior belief induced by an optimal mechanism, Receiver
is indierent between two actions. Hence, in that case, the optimal mechanism necessarily brings
Receiver as close as possible to taking some action less desirable than the equilibrium one.
To generalize (iii), say that ^ v is monotonic if for any , 0, ^ v ( + (1   )0) is monotonic in
. When ^ v is monotonic in , it is meaningful to think about beliefs that are better or worse from
Sender's perspective. The simplest denition would be that  is worse than 0 if ^ v ()  ^ v (0).
Note, however, that because v (a;!) depends on ! directly, whether  is worse in this sense depends
both on how Receiver's action changes at  and how  aects Sender's expected utility directly.
It turns out that for our result we need a denition of worse that isolates the way beliefs aect
Receiver's actions.
When ^ v is monotonic, there is a rational relation on A dened by a % a0 if ^ v ()  ^ v (0)
whenever a = ^ a() and a0 = ^ a(0). This relation on A implies a partial order on (
): say that









for any a % a0. In other words, a belief is higher in this partial order if it makes better actions
(from Sender's perspective) more desirable for Receiver. The order is partial since a belief might
make both a better and a worse action more desirable for Receiver. We say that  is a worst belief
inducing ^ a() if there is no 0 C  s.t. ^ a() = ^ a(0). We then have the following:
Proposition 12 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. If ^ v is monotonic, A is nite, and Sender benets
from persuasion, then for any interior belief  induced by an optimal mechanism either: (i)  is a
24worst belief inducing ^ a(), or (ii) both Sender and Receiver are indierent between two actions at
.
We have already discussed the basic intuition behind this Proposition: the expected posterior
must equal the prior; hence more undesirable beliefs that induce a given action increase the prob-
ability of beliefs that induce a more desirable action. Proposition 12 is the reason why, in our
initial example, when the judge convicts she is barely willing to do so. Proposition 12 shows that
the force behind this result applies more broadly.
Case (ii) is necessary to deal with the possibility of a belief which could be interpreted both as
a worst or a best belief inducing ^ a(): if both Sender and Receiver are indierent between, say a
and a0 at , the choice of ^ a() from fa;a0g is entirely arbitrary. However, for generic preferences,
there will be no belief where both Sender and Receiver are indierent between two actions at a
same belief.
Finally, we consider the case where payos depend only on the expected state. Recall that
we established earlier that in this case there is a function e v s.t. e v (E [!]) = ^ v (), and that








. We might conjecture




. This conjecture turns out to be false.
Recall from the discussion of Proposition 6 that even though we know there is always a  s.t.




, such  need not be Bayes-plausible. In order
to show that Sender could benet from persuasion, we had to mix the beliefs in the support of 






For a concrete example, suppose that A = [0;1], 
 = f 1;0;1g, u(a;!) =  (a   !)
2, and










= 1. Yet, whenever the prior puts any weight on ! = 0, the value of any
mechanism is strictly less than 1: Specically, suppose that the prior 0 is ("=2;1   ";"=2). In
that case, when " is close to 0, the value of an optimal mechanism is close to 0. Hence, when
payos depend only on the expected state, we can use e v to determine whether Sender benets from
persuasion, but not to determine an optimal mechanism or its value. To examine the optimal
mechanism, we need to analyze ^ v directly or derive its properties from Propositions 11, 12, and 10.
256 Examples
In this section we develop several examples that are meant to demonstrate the breadth of settings
captured by our model and illustrate the ways in which the results developed in the previous two
sections can be applied.
6.1 Tenure-track midterm review
We begin with an example that illustrates the applicability of our results to problems from contract
theory. We examine what type of information a university should provide to an assistant professor
whose willingness to exert eort depends on her likelihood of getting tenure. This setting is one
where structuring information provision may be a particularly useful way to induce eort because
other instruments are less potent than usually. Paying the professor based on the quality of
her research may be infeasible as this quality is likely to be non-veriable, while the institutional
structure of universities makes it dicult to motivate untenured faculty by suitably allocating
property rights.
An assistant professor chooses an eort level a 2 [0;1] to exert before coming up for tenure.
There are two types of individuals denoted by ! 2 f1;2g. The university and the professor share
a prior 0 over the professor's type. The quality of research produced by an individual of type !
who exerts eort a is a!. At the end of the tenure clock, the individual is tenured if the quality
of her research is above some cuto level, say 3/2.19 If she is tenured, she receives utility a!  a2,
receiving the recognition for the quality of her research (a!), but suering a disutility a2 from her
eort. If she is not tenured, she leaves academia and receives no recognition for her research but
still suers the sunk cost of eort, i.e. her utility is  a2. The university wants to maximize the
expected quality of the research produced by the professor. It conducts a midterm review which
results in a signal  : f1;2g ! (S). What type of a midterm review process maximizes the
university's objective?
We begin by computing ^ v, denoting Pr(! = 2) by . Simple algebra reveals that the professor's
19Note that such a rule is feasible even if quality of research is non-veriable if the university wants to give tenure




> > > > <
> > > > :
0 if  < 3=8
3=4 if 3=8   < 3=4
 if   3=4:
Hence, the university's expected utility given the professor's belief is:
^ v () =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
0 if  < 3=8
3=4(1 + ) if 3=8   < 3=4
 + 2 if   3=4:
What do our Propositions tell us about this example? Propositions 2 and 8 do not apply
since ^ v is neither convex nor concave. Also, since there is information the university would share,
Proposition 3 does not rule out the possibility that the university might benet from persuasion.
In fact, Proposition 4 directly tells us that, at least if 0 < 3=8, the university will benet from
persuasion. Proposition 9 tells us that the optimal midterm review need not induce more than
two distinct eort levels. Finally, Proposition 10 implies that whenever the professor exerts no
eort, she is completely certain that she is a low type. The reason for this feature of the optimal
review is that any posterior weight on the high type is \wasted" when the posterior is below 3/8
since that weight is still insucient to lift eort below zero and yet it reduces the probability of a
more favorable, eort-inducing, opinion the professor can have about herself.
Because of the simplicity of the state space in this example, we can also easily depict ^ v and its
concave closure (Figure 4). The gure makes it clear that the university generically benets from
persuasion.20 Moreover, it shows that the optimal structure of the performance review depends on
the prior. When the initial probability that the professor is a high type is below 3/8, the optimal
review induces posteriors  = 0 and  = 3=8. When the prior is above 3/8, then the optimal
review induces  = 3=8 and  = 1. Note that regardless of what the prior is, it is never optimal to
fully reveal the type. When the prior is below 3=8, revealing that the type is high with certainty is
very costly because this realization happens too rarely relative to the eort it induces. When the












Figure 4: optimal midterm review
prior is above 3=8, revealing that the type is low with certainty is very costly because eort drops
discontinuously when prospect of tenure becomes too dim (i.e., when  falls below 3=8).
This simple model illustrates the way in which the tools developed in this paper can be used
to study optimal feedback when actions are not fully contractible. Moreover, as we mentioned
earlier, by redening v we can use the same approach to nd mechanisms that maximize social
welfare rather than the university's preferences.
6.2 Preference disagreement
Here we consider the question of how certain types of preference disagreement between Sender and
Receiver aect the amount of information transmitted under the optimal persuasion mechanism.
Let u =  (a   !)
2, v =  (a   (b1 + b2!))
2, and A = 
 = [0;1].21 Parameters b1 and b2 capture
two types of preference disagreement: values of b1 away from 0 indicate that Sender and Receiver
disagree about the best average level of a while values of b2 away from 1 indicates that they disagree
about how the action should vary with the state.
21Recall that Appendix B shows our approach extends to compact metric state spaces.
28In order to determine how information transmission depends on b1 and b2 it will suce to
compute ^ v. Since u =  (a   !)
2 we know that
^ a() = E [!].
Given this ^ a, simple algebra reveals that
^ v () =  b2




+ (2b2   1)(E [!])
2 :














d () = 0.
Since the  b2




term is constant across all Bayes-plausible 's, this










d () = 0.
Hence, b1 does not aect Sender's problem. Moreover, ^ v is linear when b2 = 1
2, strictly convex
when b2 > 1
2, and strictly concave when b2 < 1
2. Therefore, by Proposition 8, no disclosure is
uniquely optimal when b2 < 1
2 and full disclosure is uniquely optimal when b2 > 1
2. When b2 = 1
2
all mechanisms yield the same value.
If we consider a simpler state space, we can develop a geometric intuition for this example.







depicts ^ v for a few values of b2. Recall that, for the reasons we just discussed, the shape of ^ v does
not depend on b1; this parameter only aects the vertical location ^ v: Figure 5 clearly demonstrates
that b2 changes the concavity of ^ v. While these graphs provide some geometric intuition, it is
22Note that the expression for ^ v above still applies with this simplied state space.
29(a) b2 = 0 (b) b2 =
1
2 (c) b2 = 1
Figure 5: shape of ^ v depends on b2
worthwhile to note that the algebra above provides an illustration of the practical usefulness of
formulating Sender's problem in terms of ^ v even when the state space is too rich for this function
to be depicted.
Now, what do the results above tell us about the impact of preference disagreement on infor-
mation transmitted in an optimal mechanism? First, note that b1 has no impact on the relative
value of any two mechanisms. This stands in sharp contrast to the results from cheap talk games.
Crawford and Sobel's (1982) main example considers preferences of the form u =  (a   !)
2,
v =  (a   !   b1)
2, which are equivalent to our example when b2 = 1. They show that as soon
as jb1j > 1
4, no communication is possible in any equilibrium of the cheap talk game. By compari-
son, the optimal persuasion mechanism induces full disclosure for any value of b1. The reason for
this dierence is that Sender's commitment frees him from the temptation to try to increase the
average level of Receiver's action, the temptation which is so costly both for him and for Receiver
in the equilibrium of the cheap talk game. Under any mechanism, Receiver's expected action is a
given. Moreover, conditional on Receiver's expected action, Sender and Receiver completely agree
on which actions are more desirable in which state. Hence, providing Receiver with anything short
of a fully informative signal only induces an additional cost to Sender.
The other parameter, b2, measures disagreement over how the action should vary with the
state. When b2 = 1, Sender and Receiver completely agree on how action should vary with
the state. Hence, full disclosure is uniquely optimal. When b2 > 1, Receiver's actions are
insuciently sensitive to the state from Sender's perspective. Because Receiver under-reacts to
information, however, Sender still strictly prefers to fully disclose everything, even if preference
disagreement is very large, because anything short of that would only exacerbate the problem of
30under-reaction. When 0 < b2 < 1, Receiver's actions are overly sensitive to the state, though











, Sender cuts all information ow to Receiver. Finally, when b2 < 0, Receiver
reacts to any information in a way opposite to the one Sender wishes, so he reduces her information
as much as possible.
6.3 Informative advertisements with unit demand
Now consider an example where a rm faces a continuum of ex ante identical consumers, each of
whom decides whether to buy one unit of the rm's product or not. The rm's product has quality
! 2 [0;1] and the consumers' utility from purchasing the product is !  p, where p is an exogenous
price, also in the unit interval. The consumers and the rm share the prior 0 on the quality
of the product. The assumption of symmetric information is most palatable if we conceptualize
quality as driven by the match between consumers' uncertain tastes and the products' uncertain
characteristics. Since consumers are risk-neutral, each will buy the product if and only if E [!]  p
where  is their posterior belief about the quality of the product. To make things interesting, we
suppose that consumers's default action is not to buy, i.e., E0 [!] < p.
The rm chooses an advertising campaign which provides a signal about quality  : [0;1] !
(S). All consumers see the advertisement. We assume that the rm is risk-neutral and only
cares about the expected revenue, so it does not matter whether each consumer gets an independent
realization of the signal (which would mean they end up with heterogeneous posteriors) or all
consumers get the same realization (which means they would have identical posteriors). Because
consumers are ex ante homogeneous, our results apply directly to this example even though we
have multiple Receivers.23
We again begin by computing ^ v. Denoting the decision to buy with 1 and the alternative with






0 if E [!] < p
1 E [!]  p




0 if E [!] < p
1 E [!]  p
.
Moreover, since payos depend only on the expected state, we can dene e v (E [!]) = ^ v ().
What do our Propositions tell us about this example? Propositions 2 and 8 do not apply since
^ v is neither convex nor concave. Because E0 [!] < p, there is information the rm would share.
Hence, Proposition 3 does not exclude the possibility that the rm might benet from persuasion.
In fact, since consumers' preference for not buying is discrete at the prior, Proposition 4 implies
that the rm does benet from persuasion. Moreover, we know that any consumer who buys the
product will have the posterior  s.t. E [!] = p (Proposition 12), while any consumer who does
not buy will have a posterior that puts zero weight on the possibility that !  p (Proposition 10).
This tells us that the optimal advertising campaign induces two types of reactions in consumers:
some consumers become completely convinced that the product is not worth its price, while others
buy the product, albeit reluctantly. The basic intuition for this stems from the fact that worsening
the opinion of the product by those who are already not buying it is costless to the rm, and yet
it increases the probability of more favorable reactions by others (because of Bayes-plausibility).
Hence, those who do not buy the product are driven to complete certainty that it is not worth
buying. On the other hand, improving the opinion of the product by those who are already willing
to buy it does not generate further sales, and yet it decreases the likelihood of such favorable
impressions. Hence, the optimal advertising campaign makes all buyers marginal.
In this example, ^ v is dicult to visualize but since payos depend only on the expected state, we








, Proposition 6 tells us there exists
an advertising campaign that increases rm's revenue. Also, as we discussed at the end of Section

















Figure 6: advertising to increase sales
7 Extensions and Limitations
7.1 Dynamic Mechanisms
We have restricted our attention to a class of persuasion mechanisms where there is a single stage
of communication. Sender sees only one draw of private information, and sends only one message
to Receiver. In reality, however, persuasion often happens over multiple periods. Firms may send
multiple ads, a prosecutor may go through successive rounds of gathering and reporting information,
and so forth.
Our framework can easily accommodate one class of dynamic mechanisms. Consider an ex-
tended denition of a persuasion mechanism that has T periods with possibly dierent signals and
messaging technologies (t;ct) at each stage. Sender privately observes realization s1 2 S1 from
1 (j!) and chooses a message m1 2 M1 which Receiver observes. Sender then privately observes
realization s2 2 S2, sends message m2 2 M2, observes realization s3 2 S3 and so on up to period
T. After Receiver observes the nal message mT, she chooses her action a 2 A. We dene an
equilibrium of such a mechanism exactly as before.
Any equilibrium of such a dynamic mechanism must still induce a distribution of posteriors 
33at the point that Receiver chooses her action, and the expected value of v will still be equal across
all mechanisms that induce the same distribution . Therefore, the argument that was used to
prove Proposition 1 implies that if there exists some dynamic mechanism with value v there also
exists a straightforward static mechanism with value v. This means that all our core results on
optimal mechanisms and the situations where Sender benets from persuasion apply directly to
this dynamic case as well.
A dierent class of dynamic mechanisms is one where Receiver chooses an action in each period.
Suppose, for example, that we modify the denition of a dynamic mechanism above and assume
that after observing m1 Receiver chooses action a1 2 A; after observing m2 Receiver chooses
action a2 2 A; and so on. Sender's and Receiver's payos are v (a1;:::;aT;!) and u(a1;:::;aT;!),
respectively.
This case is much more complicated. Sender's expected payo now depends not only on the
distribution of Receiver's beliefs at time T, but also on the distribution of her beliefs at each





. We conjecture that we can still express Sender's expected utility as E^ v (1;:::;T), and
moreover, that it is still possible to restrict attention to something analogous to honest mechanisms,
provided that Sender's private signals can be conditioned on Receiver's past actions. However, the
construction of ^ v for any given problem is now more complex, and the Bayes-plausibility constraint
for sequences of beliefs is more complicated than for a single distribution of beliefs. We have not
attempted to extend either our geometric intuitions or our analytical results to this case.
7.2 Receiver's Private Information
Extending our analysis to situations where Receiver has private information is straightforward.
Given a mechanism (;c), suppose that the timing of the game is as follows. First, nature selects
! from 
 according to 0. Neither Sender nor Receiver observe nature's move. Then, Sender
privately observes a realization s 2 S from  (j!) and chooses a message m 2 M. Then, Receiver
privately observes a realization r 2 R from some signal (j!). Finally, Receiver observes m and
chooses an action a 2 A. Note that if Receiver instead observes her private information before
Sender observes his signal or before he sends his message, the game can be re-formulated with the
34timing above without loss of generality because Sender's action is independent of Receiver's private
information (since he does not observe it) and Receiver always chooses her action after observing
m. We still assume that Sender and Receiver share a prior 0 at the outset of the game.
The only way in which Receiver's private information changes our analysis is that we can no
longer construct a deterministic function ^ a() which gives Receiver's action at any belief. Rather,
for any , Receiver's optimal action ^ a(;r) depends on the realization of her private signal and
so is stochastic from Sender's perspective. When his posterior is , Sender assigns probability
(rj!)(!) to the event that Receiver's signal is r and the state is !. Hence, Sender's expected
utility when he induces belief  is:







Once we reformulate ^ v this way, our approach applies directly. In particular, our key simplifying
results|Proposition 1, Corollary 1, Corollary 2|still hold. Aside from the fact that constructing
^ v is slightly more complicated, the analysis of the problem in terms of the properties of ^ v and its
concave closure V proceeds exactly as before. That said, some of our characterization results, such
as that Receiver's preference is never discrete at any interior  induced by an optimal mechanism,
will no longer hold.
A dierent type of situation that involves private information is when Receiver's preferences
depend on some parameter  2  which is unrelated to !. This distinction matters because we still
assume that Sender's private signal is informative only about !. Hence, no mechanism provides
any additional information to Sender about . For example, in our motivating example, the judge
might have unobservable, idiosyncratic aversion toward convicting an innocent defendant, which
would aect the posterior cuto at which she is willing to convict.24 The prosecutor's investigation,
however, would not provide any information about the judge's preferences.
Despite this distinction, we can handle this situation in the same way as the one before. Again,
the only impact of private information is that Receiver's optimal action ^ a(;) is stochastic from
Sender's perspective. Letting  denote the distribution of , Sender's expected utility when he
24Another example of this type of private information is the value of Receiver's outside option in Rayo and Segal
(2008).
35induces belief  is:







Here again, once we thus reformulate ^ v, we can analyze the problem in terms of ^ v and V in
exactly the same way as before.
7.3 Multiple Receivers
In many settings of interest|politicians persuading voters, rms advertising to consumers, auctions|
our assumption that there is a single Receiver is unrealistic. Suppose there are n receivers. For ease
of exposition we maintain our common prior assumption, which in this setting means that Sender
and all receivers share a prior 0 over 
.25 Sender's utility is now a function of each receiver's
action: v (a1;:::;an;!). There are two classes of multiple-receiver models where our results can be
extended quite easily.
The rst class is one where Sender sends separate (possibly correlated) messages to each receiver,
Sender's utility is separable across receivers' actions,26 and each receiver cares only about her own
action. In this case, we can simply apply our approach separately to Sender's problem vis- a-vis
each receiver. Since Sender's utility is separable, each receiver sees only her own message, and
no receiver cares about what other receivers are doing, we basically have n copies of our standard
problem with a single Receiver. In the special case where all receivers have the same utility function,
the optimal mechanism will of course be the same for each receiver, so the analysis collapses to a
single problem identical to the one we have analyzed before, as in the example of section 6.3.
The second class of models is where Sender can only persuade by revealing public information.
That is, any message from Sender is observed by all receivers. In this case, our approach applies
no matter whether receivers then choose their individual actions simultaneously, in sequence, or
according to some other game. Moreover, Sender's utility need not be separable across receivers'
actions, receivers might care about each other's actions, and they might have heterogeneous util-
25There are no additional complications from having both multiple receivers and private information on their part.
The approach from the previous Subsection for dealing with private information applies equally well to the case with
multiple receivers.
26When v is not separable across the ai's the problem is similar to that of dynamic mechanisms where Receiver
chooses an action in each period.
36ity functions. An example of a setting like this is Milgrom and Weber's (1982) model of public
information revelation in auctions with a common-value component.27
For simplicity, consider the case where the equilibrium of the post-message game is in pure
strategies.28 If the post-message game does not have a unique equilibrium, we focus on an equi-
librium which yields the highest payo to Sender, analogously to our earlier equilibrium selection
rule. Let ^ ai () represent the ith receiver's equilibrium action when she has belief . We can then
dene ^ v as a function of receivers' shared posterior :




v (^ a1 ();:::;^ an ();!)(!):
With this reformulation of ^ v, our basic approach again applies. Proposition 1, Corollary 1, and
Corollary 2 all still hold. Constructing ^ v is potentially much more complicated here since it involves
solving for the equilibria of the post-message game, but the analysis of the problem in terms of the
properties of ^ v and V is exactly the same as before. Of course, characterization results which are
stated in terms of Receiver's preferences, such as Proposition 4, would have to be reinterpreted.
There is an important third class of multiple-receiver models where our results do not extend
easily: those where the receivers care about each other's actions and Sender can send private signals
to individual receivers (e.g., Es} o and Szentes 2007). The crucial problem with this case is that for a
given set of beliefs that receivers hold after observing their messages, the receivers' actions may vary
as a function of the mechanism that produced those beliefs. In an auction for example, a bidder
with a given belief may behave dierently if she believes that other bidders are receiving highly
informative signals than if she believes they are receiving uninformative signals. This means that
the key simplifying step in our analysis|reducing the problem of nding an optimal mechanism to
one of maximizing over distributions of posterior beliefs|does not apply.
27Milgrom and Weber (1982) allow for bidders to have private information. As we mentioned earlier, the previous
Subsection provides a way of incorporating that possibility.
28If the equilibrium is in mixed strategies, the only additional complication is that actions are stochastic for a given
belief, but we have already shown that this poses no problems for our approach.
377.4 Multiple Senders
Our model can also be used to think about settings with multiple senders. Suppose there is a
single Receiver who receives messages from multiple senders. Receiver observes all the messages
and then takes a single action. All senders and Receiver share a common prior and each sender's
utility depends on Receiver's action and the state of the world.
If we simply wish to know whether there is a an informational environment that increases some
weighted function of senders' utilities, our previous results apply directly since they do not depend
on any particular interpretation of the objective function v (a;!). Hence, we could simply let v
be any weighted function of senders' utilities. A more interesting question is what happens if
multiple senders play a non-cooperative game. Specically, consider a game where each sender i
simultaneously29 chooses a i : 
 ! (Si), Receiver then observes all si's and takes her action.30
Taking other senders' choices as given, each sender's problem is identical to one in Subsection 7.2
where he is the only Sender and Receiver has some private information about !. The private
information here is simply the set of signal realizations from all the other senders. Hence, our tools
for nding an optimal mechanism provide a way to compute the best-response functions. Unless
one can solve for an optimal mechanism analytically, however, solving for the equilibria of this game
might be challenging. Another issue is that we can no longer speak of Receiver taking a \Sender-
preferred" action from a (). Consequently, an optimal mechanism, and hence a best-response
function, might not always exist. To guarantee the existence of an equilibrium of this game we
would need to assume there is a uniquely optimal action for Receiver at each belief.
7.5 Limited set of signals
Throughout the paper we have assumed that the mechanism designer can choose any signal 
whatsoever. In many settings, this might be an unreasonable assumption. What can we say about
the case where only some subset of potential signals, say , is feasible? We can still formulate our
29The analysis of games where senders move sequentially is very similar.
30For the same reason that we can restrict our attention to honest mechanisms in our main model, this game is
isomorphic to one where each sender chooses a (;c) pair, observes a signal realization s from , and then sends a
message m to Receiver.






d () = 0
and  2  
where   denotes distributions of posteriors induced by honest mechanisms with a signal in .
When this additional constraint binds, however, we will not necessarily be able to use our geometric
approach. Knowing that V (0) > ^ v (0) does not tell us whether there is a Bayes-plausible  2  
s.t. E^ v () > ^ v (0).
There is one particular type of limitation on , however, which our approach handles easily.
Suppose that we can express the state space as 
, denoting a particular state by (!;). More-
over, suppose that the set of potential signals  consists of all signals that provide no information
about . Then, the situation is closely analogous to one in Subsection 7.2 where the space of signals
is arbitrarily rich, but Receiver's preferences depend on some parameter  2  which is unrelated
to !. The only dierence is that Receiver's action no longer depends on , but Sender's utility
v (a;(!;)) now does. This poses no further complications. Sender's utility when he induces a
belief  on 
 is simply:







where  denotes his prior on . Again, with this reformulation of ^ v, Proposition 1, Corollary 1,
and Corollary 2 all still hold:
Finally, the possibility that   might not always include all Bayes-plausible 's has important
implications. Consider a modication of our initial example. Suppose there are two types of
prosecutors: a high-ability prosecutor who can structure his investigation so as to generate any
signal , and a low-ability prosecutor who has access to a limited set of signals. If this set does not
include the optimal signal, the high-ability prosecutor will convict a higher percentage of defendants
than the low-ability one even if the judge is fully aware of the dierence in prosecutors' abilities.
The rationality of the judge does not imply that she will somehow compensate for the prosecutor's
39type. More broadly, the benet to Sender from expanding   might partly explain the observed
large expenditures on persuasive activities.
7.6 Limited Commitment
What can we say about settings where Sender is unable to commit to an honest mechanism?
The rst thing to note is that our results provide an upper bound on gains from communication
in any persuasion mechanism. By Proposition 1, we know that the value to Sender from being
able to communicate with Receiver can only be weakly lower when he cannot commit to an honest
mechanism. This observation has important implications even in models without commitment.
Consider, for example, Spence's (1973) signalling model. Since the worker's wage in that model is
the expectation of his type, we know that ^ v is linear, so the worker (Sender) cannot benet from
persuasion. Hence, even without solving for the equilibria of this signalling game, we know that
in any equilibrium the average worker would be weakly better o if a government policy outlawed
education.31
More broadly, in any game captured by our denition of a persuasion mechanism, Sender values
his ability to communicate with Receiver no more than V (0)   ^ v (0). However, this provides
only an upper bound to the value of communication in games without commitment. In some
settings, V (0) ^ v (0) might be large and yet Sender might not benet at all from an opportunity
to communicate with Receiver.
In the remainder of this section we analyze more directly what the gains from communication
are when Sender cannot commit to an honest messaging technology but retains his choice of what
information to gather. Specically, we analyze the choice of an optimal signal when the message
technology c is constant. We call such mechanisms commitment-free. If there is a commitment-free
mechanism with a strictly positive gain, we will say that benecial persuasion without commitment
is possible:
The analysis of commitment-free mechanisms is closely related to the questions in Green and
Stokey (2007). Assuming cheap talk messaging, they also consider the benets that might arise
from reducing the informativeness of Sender's signal.32 In contrast to their paper, which focuses on
31In fact, in any equilibrium with positive signalling costs, he would be strictly better o under such policy.
32Note that Crawford and Sobel (1982) implicitly assume that Sender receives a fully informative signal. They
40local improvements in informativeness, we here derive bounds on the benet from persuasion when
Sender has a choice over an arbitrary signal. The analysis here is also related to Ivanov (2008).
He, however, focuses on the question of when restricting Sender's information benets Receiver,
while we explore when Sender can be made better o by being less informed.33 Throughout the
analysis we assume that Receiver observes what information Sender has. In a dierent game,
where Sender chose his signal covertly, the only equilibrium would be for Sender to choose the fully
informative signal and the set of equilibria would be isomorphic to those of Crawford and Sobel
(1982).
As in all cheap talk settings, incentive compatibility is the key obstacle to communication
in commitment-free mechanisms. Sender, however, can often choose to gather information which
mitigates the incentive compatibility problem: he can choose to learn information with the property
that ex post his utility is maximized by truthfully reporting what he learns. When the chosen
signal has this property, Receiver can accept Sender's messages at face value.
Consider the case where Sender's preferences are independent of the state. In this case, Sender
can credibly convey messages if and only if he is completely indierent between the actions they
induce. For example, suppose 
 = f0;1g, A = [0;1], 0 = 1
4, u =  (a   !)




2. Here, Sender's optimal commitment-free mechanism is a signal  on fl;hg with
 (lj0) = 2
3  (lj1) = 0
 (hj0) = 1
3  (hj1) = 1:
This signal induces posteriors l (1) = 0 and h (1) = 1
2, which yield exactly the same value of
^ v. Hence, Sender can truthfully reveal the signal realization. By contrast, if Sender were fully
informed, Receiver would not believe his reports that (1) = 1 and thus Sender would not benet
from persuasion.
This example is an instance of a more general result that the gain which Sender can obtain
when his utility is independent of the state is equal to the distance between ^ v (0) and the greatest
assume that Sender observes the value of an arbitrary random variable, but since both Sender's and Receiver's utilities
are dened solely in terms of this random variable, the state space is eectively the set of realizations of the random
variable and Sender is thus perfectly informed of the state.
33In related work, Goltsman et al. (2009) identify optimal rules under cheap talk within three classes of mechanisms
(mediation, arbitrarion and negotation).
41value of ^ v that is constant across beliefs whose convex hull includes the prior. Let
E = supfvj9M  (
) s.t. ^ v () = v 8 2 M and 0 2 co(M)g   ^ v (0).
Because ^ v is not necessarily continuous, the sup in the expression above may not be obtained, and
hence an optimal commitment-free mechanisms might not always exist. However, we can always
nd a commitment-free mechanism whose value is arbitrarily close to E.
Proposition 13 Suppose v is independent of !. The gain from any commitment-free mechanism
is weakly less than E. For any " > 0, there exists a commitment-free mechanism whose gain
exceeds E   ". Benecial persuasion without commitment is possible if and only if E > 0.
Often, E will be equal to zero and benecial persuasion without commitment will be possible
only if v depends on the state. When v varies with !, Sender can mitigate the incentive compatibil-
ity constraint by choosing a signal that induces posteriors at which his preferences are aligned with
those of Receiver. Consider the following example. Let 
 = f!1;!2;!3gand A = fa1;a2g. The
beliefs where an agent is indierent between the two actions form a straight line in the probability
triangle. Suppose preferences are such that these lines are as in Figure 7. The line where Receiver
is indierent between the actions is the darker, steeper one; she prefers a1 when her beliefs are in
the Southeast portion of the simplex. The line where Sender is indierent is the one that is less
dark and less steep; he prefers a1 in the Northwest portion of the simplex.
For most beliefs, Sender and Receiver disagree on which action is preferable. The shaded areas
indicate the small regions of agreement. Let Z denote the union of these two areas. Because they
disagree on the appropriate action at the degenerate beliefs, no communication would be possible if
Sender were perfectly informed. If Receiver takes both a1 and a2 in equilibrium, Sender will always
send a message that induces his preferred action. But Receiver knows that, for any degenerate
belief that Sender has, she prefers the other action. Thus, an equilibrium where both actions are
taken cannot exist.
If, however, Sender limits his information, both Receiver and Sender can benet from commu-
nication. In particular whenever 0 belongs to the convex hull of Z, but not to Z itself, benecial








Figure 7: persuasion without committment
 which induces 1 and 2, he will have the incentive to truthfully reveal the signal realization.
Receiver will be aware of this and both will benet from persuasion without commitment.
The gain that Sender can achieve from persuasion due to such alignment of preferences is





! v (a;!)   min
! v (a;!)

denote a measure of the sensitivity of v to !. When ^ v () is monotonic,34 Sender can achieve incen-
tive compatibility only by selecting posteriors at which his preferences are aligned with Receiver's,
and the gain from any commitment-free mechanism cannot exceed D.
Proposition 14 If ^ v is monotonic, the gain from any commitment-free mechanism is at most D.
Since E is necessarily equal to zero when ^ v is monotonic, both Proposition 13 and Proposition
13 yield the following Corollary.
Corollary 3 If ^ v is monotonic and v is state-independent, benecial persuasion without commit-
ment is not possible:
34A condition weaker than monotonicity will also suce. Say ^ v is without troughs if there do not exist a;b;c
and  2 (0;1) s.t. b = a + (1   )c and minf^ v (a); ^ v (c)g > ^ v (b). As the proof in Appendix A shows, the
subsequent Proposition and Corollary both hold if we assume ^ v is without troughs rather than monotonic.
438 Conclusion
There are two ways to induce a person to do something. One is to incentivize her, whether by
increasing her reward from taking a particular action, or by increasing her punishment for doing
something else. Such incentive schemes can be blunt, as when you pay someone for performing
a task or coerce her into doing it, or more subtle, as when you increase the supply of goods
complementary to an activity. All such schemes, however, rely on changing the individual's
marginal preferences. The other way to induce a person to do something is to change her beliefs.
Changes in beliefs can change the expected action for several reasons. One is that the person being
persuaded may fail to fully account for the motives of the persuader. Another is that overwhelming
an individual with information may make it too dicult to process all of it an appropriate way.
Yet another, which is the focus of this paper, is that even a perfectly rational Bayesian can often
be persuaded.
9 Appendix A: Proofs
9.1 Proof of Proposition 1
As we mentioned in the text, (2) immediately implies (1) and (3). We rst show that (1) implies
(2):
Consider an equilibrium "o = (o;o;o) of some mechanism (o;co) with value v. For any
a, let Ma be the set of messages which induce a: Ma = fmj^ a() = mg in this equilibrium. Now,







In other words, in the proposed mechanism Sender \replaces" each message with a recommendation
of the action that the message induced. Since a was an optimal response to each m 2 Ma in "o,
it must also be an optimal response to the message a in the proposed straightforward mechanism.
Hence, the distribution of Receiver's actions conditional on the state is the same as in "o. Therefore,






! c(mjs)o (mjs)o (sj!), the
44value of the straightforward mechanism is exactly v. Hence, (1) implies (2).
It remains to show that (3) implies (1). In other words, we need to show that given any
Bayes-plausible distribution of posteriors, there exists a mechanism that induces it. We will show
a stronger claim that there exists an honest mechanism that induces it. An honest mechanism
with signal  induces  if Supp() = fsgs2S and
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,
which establishes (i). Hence,  induces .
459.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose that ^ v is concave. That means that for any , E (^ v ())  ^ v (E ()). Hence, for
any Bayes-plausible , E (^ v ())  ^ v (0). Hence, by Corollary 1, Sender does not benet from
persuasion. Now, suppose that ^ v is convex and not concave. The fact that it is not concave means
that there exists some a and b and  2 (0;1) s.t. ^ v (a + (1   )b) < ^ v (a) + (1   ) ^ v (b).
Now, consider the belief c = a + (1   )b. Since 0 is not on the boundary of (
), there
exists a belief d and a  2 (0;1) s.t. 0 = c +(1   )d. Moreover, since ^ v is convex, we know
that
^ v (0) = ^ v (c + (1   )d)
 ^ v (c) + (1   ) ^ v (d)
= ^ v (a + (1   )b) + (1   ) ^ v (d)
<  (^ v (a) + (1   ) ^ v (b)) + (1   ) ^ v (d).
Now, let  be the distribution of posteriors that puts probability  on a,  (1   ) on b and
(1   ) on d. By construction,  is Bayes-plausible and E^ v () > ^ v (0).
9.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose that 8, ^ v () 
P
!
v (^ a(0);!)(!). Given an equilibrium (;;) of some mecha-






 (mjs) (sj!)0 (!):
46The value of the mechanism is at most:
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m2M


















v (^ a(0);!)0 (!)
= ^ v (0).
9.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose there is information Sender would share and Receiver's preference is discrete at the prior.
Since u is continuous in !,
P
u(^ a(0);!)(!) is continuous in . Therefore, since Receiver's pref-
erence is discrete at the prior, 9 > 0 s.t. for all  in an -ball around 0, ^ a() = ^ a(0). Denote this
ball by B. Since there is information Sender would share, 9h s.t. ^ v (h) >
P
! v (^ a(0);!)h (!).
Consider a ray from h through 0. Since 0 is not on the boundary of (
), there exists a belief on
that ray, l s.t. l 2 B and 0 = l+(1   )h for some  2 (0;1). Now, consider the distribu-
tion of posteriors  (l) = ,  (h) = 1 . Since ^ a(0) = ^ a(l), ^ v (l) =
P
! v (^ a(0);!)l (!).
Hence,




v (^ a(0);!)l (!) + (1   )
X
!








v (^ a(0);!)0 (!)
= ^ v (0)
Since  is Bayes-plausible, Sender benets from persuasion.
479.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Suppose A is nite. We begin with the following Lemma:























8a 6= ^ a(), which means that Receiver's preference is discrete at .
Given this Lemma, it will suce to show that the set
n






has measure zero. Note that this set is a subset of
n











Hence, it will suce to show that the latter set has measure zero. In fact, since there are only
nitely many pairs of actions a, a0, and since the union of a nite number of measure-zero sets has













Given any distinct a and a0, index states by i and let i = u(a;!i)   u(a0;!i). Let  =





zero. Recall that for any action a there exits a  s.t. a () = fag. That means that there is
necessarily an ! s.t. u(a;!) 6= u(a0;!). Hence, there is at least one i 6= 0. Therefore,  is





is measure zero with respect to the Lebesgue measure on Rn.
9.6 Proof of Proposition 6
As we mentioned in footnote 11, we will establish a somewhat stronger proposition which implies
Proposition 6. Suppose that there exists a linear transformation T : (
) ! Rk s.t. ^ v () =
e v (T). Let e V denote the concave closure of e v. Then,
Proposition 15 Sender benets from persuasion if and only if e V (T0) > e v (T0).
Proof. Suppose e V (T0) > e v (T0). That implies there exists a z s.t. z > e v (T0) and
(T0;z) 2 co(e v). Hence, there exists a set (ti)
k+1
i=1 w/ ti 2 Image(T) and weights  2 k+1 s.t.
P
i iti = T0 and
P
i ie v (ti) > e v (T0). For each i, select any i from T 1ti. Let a =
Pk+1
i=1 ii.






i iti = T0. Since 0 is not on
the boundary of n, there exists a belief b and a  2 (0;1) s.t. a + (1   )b = 0. Since
T is linear, Tb = 1
1  (T0   Ta). Therefore, since Ta = T0, we have Tb = T0: Hence,
e v (T0) = e v (Tb). Now, consider a mechanism that induces the distribution of posteriors
 (i) = i for i = 1;:::;k + 1
 (b) = 1   
Since a =
Pk+1
i=1 ii and a + (1   )b = 0, this  is Bayes-plausible. The value of the
mechanism that induces this  is
X
i








ie v (ti) + (1   )e v (T0)
> e v (T0) + (1   )e v (T0)
= e v (T0)
= ^ v (0):
49Hence, Sender benets from persuasion. Now suppose e V (T0)  e v (T0). For any Bayes-plausible
distribution of posteriors , E [] = 0 implies E [T] = T0, so E [^ v ()] = E [e v (T)] 
e V (T0)  e v (T0) = ^ v (0). Hence, by Corollary 1 Sender does not benet from persuasion.
9.7 Proof of Proposition 7
We begin the proof by showing that selection of Sender-preferred equilibria implies that ^ v is upper
semicontinuous.
Lemma 2 ^ v is upper semicontinuous.
Proof. Suppose that ^ v is discontinuous at some . Since ^ v () =
P
! v (^ a();!)(!) and v is
continuous, it must be that ^ a() is discontinuous at . Since u is continuous, by Berge's Maximum
Theorem this means that Receiver must be indierent between a set of actions at , i.e., a () is
not a singleton. By denition, however, ^ v ()  maxa2a()
P
! v (a;!)(!). Hence, ^ v is upper
semicontinuous.
Now, let hyp(^ v) denote the hypograph of ^ v, i.e., the set of points lying on or below the graph.
Because, unlike the graph of ^ v, hyp(^ v) is closed and connected, it will be easier construct to work
with.
Lemma 3 Given  and S  hyp(^ v), if (;V ()) is in the convex hull of S, it is also in the convex
hull of the intersection of S and graph of ^ v.
Proof. Given  and S = f(i;zi)gi2I  hyp(^ v), suppose (;V ()) =
P
i2I i (i;zi) with
P
i2I i = 1 and i 2 [0;1] 8i 2 I. We need to show that for any i > 0, it must be the











 hyp(^ v). Since jj+
P









i2I izi = V (), we have that V () < supfzj(;z) 2 co(hyp(^ v))g =
supfzj(;z) 2 co(^ v)g. Hence, we've reached a contradiction.
Combining the two Lemmas above, we obtain the following:
Lemma 4 Any element of the graph of V can be expressed as a convex combination of elements
of the graph of ^ v.
50Proof. Since ^ v is upper semicontinuous, hyp ^ v is closed. Let H =

(;z) 2 hyp ^ vjz  inf0 ^ v (0)
	
.
Since v is continuous and A is compact, ^ v is bounded so H is bounded. Hence, since hyp ^ v is
closed, H is compact. Hence, co(H) is compact which implies co(hyp(^ v)) is closed. Hence,
hyp(V ) = co(hyp(^ v)). Hence, any element of the graph of V can be expressed a convex com-
bination of elements of hyp(^ v). But then, by Lemma 3, it can also be expressed as a convex
combination of elements of the graph of ^ v.
The remainder of the proof of Proposition 7 is straightforward. By Corollary 2, there can be
no mechanism with value strictly greater than V (0). By Lemma 4, (0;V (0)) 2 co(^ v). Hence,
there exists an optimal mechanism with value V (0):
9.8 Proof of Proposition 8
It follows directly from denition of convexity and concavity that if ^ v is (strictly) concave, no
disclosure is (uniquely) optimal, and if it is (strictly) convex, full disclosure is (uniquely) optimal.
To establish the last part of Proposition 8, we begin with a key Lemma which will also be useful
for establishing several other Propositions.
Lemma 5 If 0 is induced by an optimal mechanism, V (0) = ^ v (0).
Proof. Suppose that an optimal mechanism induces  and there is some 0 s.t.  (0) > 0 and
V (0) > ^ v (0). Since (0;V (0)) 2 co(^ v), there exists a distribution of posteriors 0 such that
E0 = 0 and E0^ v () = V (0). But then we can then take all the weight from 0 and place it




> > > > <
> > > > :
 (0)0 () if  2 Supp(0)nSupp()
 () +  (0)0 () if  2 Supp(0) \ Supp()
 () if  2 Supp()n(Supp(0) [ f0g):
By construction,  is plausible and yields a higher value than  does.
Suppose ^ v is not concave and an optimal mechanism induces an interior m. By Lemma 5,
we know V (m) = ^ v (m). Since ^ v is not concave, there is some belief l s.t. V (l) > ^ v (l).
51Because m is interior, we know there is a r and  2 (0;1) s.t. m = l + (1   )r. Now,
^ v (m) = V (m)  V (l) + (1   )V (r) (by concavity of V )
 V (l) + (1   ) ^ v (r)
> ^ v (l) + (1   ) ^ v (r)
which means that ^ v is not convex.
9.9 Proof of Proposition 9
Since ^ v is bounded, hyp(^ v) is path-connected. Therefore, it is connected. The Fenchel-Bunt
Theorem (Hiriart-Urruty and Lemar echal 2004, Thm 1.3.7) states that if S  Rn has no more than
n connected components (in particular, if S is connected), then any x 2 co(S) can be expressed as
a convex combination of n elements of S. Hence, since hyp(^ v)  Rj
j, any element of co(hyp(^ v))
can be expressed as a convex combination of j
j elements of hyp(^ v). In particular, (0;V (0)) 2
co(hyp(^ v)) can be expressed a convex combination of j
j elements of hyp(^ v). But then, by Lemma
3 this further implies that (0;V (0)) can be expressed as a convex combination of j
j elements
of the graph of ^ v. Hence, there exists an optimal straightforward mechanism which induces a
distribution of posteriors whose support has no more than j
j elements. Since Receiver takes only
a single action at any of her beliefs, this implies there exists an optimal straightforward mechanism
in which the number of actions Receiver takes with positive probability is at most j
j.
9.10 Proof of Proposition 10
Suppose that v (a;!) < v (a;!) for all ! and all a 6= a. Let 
 = f!j^ a(!) = ag. Let 
 be the
complement of 
. Suppose contrary to Proposition 10 that an optimal mechanism induces  and
there is a belief 0 s.t.  (0) > 0, ^ a(0) = a and 9! 2 
 s.t. 0 (!) > 0. We can express 0 as a






1 0(!) if ! 6= !
0 if ! = !
.
52If we \replace" 0 with  and , this will yield a higher value since  induces an action Sender




cannot be any worse for Sender than ^ a(0) = a. Formally, consider
the following distribution of beliefs:























Simple algebra reveals that  is Bayes-plausible and yields a higher value than  does.
9.11 Proof of Proposition 11
We rst prove a preliminary lemma.
Lemma 6 Suppose l and r are induced by an optimal mechanism and m = l+(1   )r for
some  2 [0;1]. Then, ^ v (m)  ^ v (l) + (1   ) ^ v (r).
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that  is induced by an optimal mechanism,  (l),  (r) > 0,
and ^ v (m) > ^ v (l) + (1   ) ^ v (r). Then we can take some weight from l and r and place
it on m which would yield higher value while preserving Bayes-plausability. Formally, pick any
" 2 (0;1). Let "0 = " (l)= (r). Consider an alternative  dened by:
 (l) = (1   ") (l)
 (r) =
 
1   (1   )"0
 (r)
 (m) =  (m) + " (l)
 () =  () if  = 2 fl;m;rg:
Simple algebra reveals that  is Bayes-plausible and yields a higher value than  does.
Say that action a is induced-dominant if 8, ^ v () 
P
!
v (a;!)(!). Say that a is strictly
induced-dominant if 8 s.t. a 6= ^ a(), ^ v () <
P
!
v (a;!)(!). Say that a is weakly but not strictly




53that there is information Sender would share if and only if ^ a(0) is not induced-dominant, and
that Assumption 1 states that there are no wnsd actions.
We now prove the proposition in two steps.
Lemma 7 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Let  be an interior belief induced by an optimal
mechanism. Then, either: (i) Receiver's preference at  is not discrete, or (ii) ^ a() is strictly
induced-dominant.
Proof. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds and  is an interior belief induced by an optimal
mechanism. Now, suppose Receiver's preference at  is discrete. By Proposition 4, we know that
if  were the prior either: (i) there would be no information Sender would want to share, i.e., ^ a()
is induced dominant; or (ii) Sender would benet from persuasion. But, Sender would not benet
from persuasion if  were the prior because by Lemma 5 we know V () = ^ v (). Thus, ^ a() is
induced-dominant so by Assumption 1 it is strictly induced-dominant.
Lemma 8 Suppose Sender benets from persuasion,  is an interior belief induced by an optimal
mechanism, and ^ a() is strictly induced-dominant. Then, Receiver's preference at  is not discrete.
Proof. Suppose Sender benets from persuasion,  is an interior belief induced by an optimal
mechanism, and ^ a() is strictly induced-dominant. First note that the set of beliefs that induces
any particular action is necessarily convex. Hence, when Sender benets from persuasion, any
optimal mechanism must induce at least two distinct actions. Therefore, there must be a 0
induced by the mechanism at which ^ a() 6= ^ a(0). Now, suppose contrary to the Lemma that
Receiver's preference at  is discrete. Then, there is an " > 0 s.t. ^ a("0 + (1   ")) = ^ a(). Let
m = "0 + (1   "). Since both  and 0 are induced by an optimal mechanism, Lemma 6 tells
us that
^ v (m)  "^ v
 
0
+ (1   ") ^ v (). (3)
54But,
^ v (m) =
X
!















v (^ a();!)0 (!) + (1   ") ^ v ()
Hence, Equation (3) is equivalent to
X
!




which means ^ a() is not strictly induced-dominant.
Combining these two lemmata, we know that if Assumption 1 holds, Sender benets from
persuasion, and  is an interior belief induced by an optimal mechanism, Receiver's preference at
 is not discrete.
9.12 Proof of Proposition 12
Suppose Assumption 1 holds, ^ v is monotonic, A is nite, and Sender benets from persuasion.
Now, suppose  is an interior belief induced by an optimal mechanism. Since Assumption 1 holds
and Sender benets from persuasion, Receiver's preference at  is not discrete by Proposition 11.
Therefore, Lemma 1 tells us 9a such that Eu(^ a();!) = Eu(a;!): If (ii) does not hold, we
know Ev(^ a();!) > Ev(a;!). Therefore, ^ a() % a. Hence, given any 0 C ,
0 = Eu(^ a();!)   Eu(a;!) > E0u(^ a();!)   E0u(a;!):
Since E0u(a;!) > E0u(^ a();!), we know that ^ a() is not Receiver's optimal action when her
beliefs are . Hence, for any 0 C , ^ a(0) 6= ^ a(), which means that  is a worst belief inducing
^ a().
559.13 Proof of Proposition 13
We rst show that no commitment-free mechanism can have a gain greater than E. Suppose the
contrary. That means that in equilibrium of a mechanism, Sender conveys two messages with
positive probability m and m0 s.t. ^ v ( (jm)) > ^ v ( (jm0)). But then, since v is independent of
!, it must be the case that Sender would prot by a deviation that always sends m instead of m0.
Next, we show that for any " > 0, there is a commitment-free mechanism whose gain exceeds
E ". Given ", choose v > E "+^ v (0) s.t. 9M  (
) s.t. ^ v () = v 8 2 M and 0 2 co(M).
By denition of E, such a v exists. Now, since 0 2 co(M), there exists a Bayes-plausible  s.t.
supp()  M. Consider a commitment-free mechanism with the signal  that induces this .
Since ^ v () = v and v is independent of !, incentive compatibility does not bind. Hence, the value
of this mechanism is v so its gain is strictly greater than E   ".
9.14 Proof of Proposition 14
Even though it is not feasible for Sender to commit to an honest mechanism, he still may tell
truth in equilibrium. We say an equilibrium of a commitment-free mechanism is truthful if
 (mjs) =
1 if m=s
0 if m6=s. Given any equilibrium of any commitment-free mechanism, there exists
a truthful equilibrium of some commitment-free mechanism that generates the same distribution
of actions and beliefs. To see this, note that if some commitment-free mechanism o has an
equilibrium with a message strategy o, then  (mjs) =
1 if m=s
0 if m6=s is an equilibrium strategy if
 (mj!) =
P
s o (mjs)o (sj!). Moreover, this  and  generate the same conditional distribu-
tion of messages, and thus of actions and beliefs, as o and o. Hence, we can restrict our attention
to truthful equilibria without loss of generality.
With that observation, we establish the following Lemma:
Lemma 9 Consider any equilibrium of a commitment-free mechanism (;;). For any two
messages m and m0 sent with positive probability:









Proof. Supposing, w.l.o.g. that the equilibrium is truthful, for any two messages m and m0






v (a;!)d (ajm)  
!jm0
This implies





































+ = f! 2 
j (!jm) >  (!jm0)g and 
  = f! 2 













   (!jm)  1:
57Hence,





























































































































The key implication of Lemma 9 is the following. Given an equilibrium of a commitment-free
mechanism, let M be the set of all messages sent with a positive probability in that equilibrium.
Then,
Lemma 10 If in equilibrium of a mechanism 9m 2 M s.t. vm  ^ v (0), then the gain from that
mechanism is at most D:
Proof. Consider an equilibrium of a commitment-free mechanism (;;). Suppose 9m 2
58M s.t. vm  ^ v (0). Then, by Lemma 9




































Now, say ^ v is without troughs if there do not exist a;b;c and  2 (0;1) s.t. b = a +
(1   )c and minf^ v (a); ^ v (c)g > ^ v (b).
Lemma 11 Consider any belief 0 and any distribution of beliefs  with nite support s.t. E [] =
0. If ^ v is without troughs, then 9 2 Supp() s.t. ^ v ()  ^ v (0).
Proof. Suppose ^ v is without troughs. Given any belief 0 and any distribution of beliefs 
with nite support s.t. E [] = 0, let k = jSupp()j. We prove the Lemma by induction on k.
If k = 2, the desired conclusion is immediate. Now, suppose the Lemma holds for k = l. We need








1    (e )
:







^ v (0). But, since the Lemma holds for k = l = jSupp()nfe gj, we know there exists e 0 2









 ^ v (0).
Lemma 11 leads to the following result:
Proposition 16 If ^ v is without troughs, the gain from any commitment-free mechanism is at most
D.
59Proof. Suppose ^ v is without troughs and consider an equilibrium (;;) of any commitment-






 (mjs) (sj!)0 (!):
We know that 0 () =
P
m m (jm). Therefore, by Lemma 11, 9m 2 M s.t. vm  ^ v (0).
Hence, by Lemma 10, the gain from the mechanism is at most D.
Since ^ v is necessarily monotonic if it is without troughs, Proposition 14 is a corollary of Propo-
sition 16.
10 Appendix B: Extension to innite state spaces
In the main body of the paper, we assumed that 
 is nite. We also claimed this assumption was
made primarily for expositional convenience. In this appendix, we show that the approach used
in the paper extends to the case when 
 is a compact metric space.35
As before, Receiver has a continuous utility function u(a;!) that depends on her action a 2 A
and the state of the world ! 2 
. Sender has a continuous utility function v (a;!) that depends
on Receiver's action and the state of the world. The action space A is assumed to be compact
and the state space 
 is assumed to be a compact metric space. Let (
) denote the set of Borel
probabilities on 
, a compact metric space in the weak* topology. Sender and Receiver share a
prior 0 2 (
).
A persuasion mechanism is a combination of a signal and a message technology. A signal (;S)
consists of a compact metric realization space S and a measurable function  : [0;1] ! 
  S,
x 7! (1 (x);2 (x)). Assume that x is uniformly distributed on [0;1] and that Sender observes
2 (x). We denote a realization of 2 (x) by s. Note that since S is a compact metric space
(hence, complete and separable), there exists a regular conditional probability (i.e., a posterior
probability) obtained by conditioning on 2 (x) = s (Shiryaev 1996, p.230). A message technology
c consists of a message space M and a family of functions

c(js) : M ! R+
	
s2S. As before, a
mechanism is honest if M = S and c(mjs) =
 k if s=m
1 if s6=m for some k 2 R+. A persuasion mechanism
35We are very grateful to Max Stinchcombe for help with this extension.
60denes a game just as before. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is still the solution concept and we
still select Sender-preferred equilibria. Denitions of value and gain are same as before.
Let a () denote the set of actions optimal for Receiver given her beliefs are  2 (
):




Note that a () is an upper hemicontinuous, non-empty valued, compact valued, correspondence
from (
) to A:
Let ^ v () denote the maximum expected value of v if Receiver takes an action in a ():




Since a () is non-empty and compact and
R
v (a;!)d(!) is continuous in a, ^ v is well dened.
We rst show that the main ingredient for the existence of an optimal mechanism, namely the
upper semicontinuity of ^ v, remains true in this setting.
Lemma 12 ^ v is upper semicontinuous.
Proof. Given any a, the random variable v (a;!) is dominated by the constant random variable
max! v (a;!) (since v is continuous in ! and 
 is compact, the maximum is attained). Hence, by
the Lebesgue's Dominated Convergence Theorem,
R
v (a;!)d(!) is continuous in  for any given
a. Now, suppose that ^ v is discontinuous at some . Since u is continuous, by Berge's Maximum
Theorem this means that Receiver must be indierent between a set of actions at , i.e., a () is
not a singleton. By denition, however, ^ v ()  maxa2a()
R
v (a;!)d(!). Hence, ^ v is upper
semicontinuous.
Now, a distribution of posteriors, denoted by , is an element of the set ((
)), the set of
Borel probabilities on the compact metric space (




) d () = 0. We say that  induces  if conditioning on 2 (x) = s gives
posterior s and the distribution of 2(x) is  given that x is uniformly distributed: Since 
 is
a compact metric space, for any Bayes-plausible  there exists a  that induces it.36 Hence, the
36Personal communication with Max Stinchcombe. Detailed proof available upon request.












d () = 0.
Now, let
V  supfzj(;z) 2 co(hyp(^ v))g;
where co() denotes the convex hull and hyp() denotes the hypograph. Recall that given a subset
K of an arbitrary vector space, co(K) is dened as \fCjK  C, C convexg. Let g (0) denote
the subset of ((












^ v()d () = V (0)
)
:
Note that we still have not established that g (0) is non-empty. That is the primary task of the
proof of our main proposition.
Proposition 17 Optimal mechanism exists. Value of an optimal mechanism is V (0). Sender
benets from persuasion i V (0) > ^ v (0). An honest mechanism with a signal that induces an
element of g (0) is optimal.
Proof. By construction of V , there can be no mechanism with value strictly greater than
V (0). We need to show there exists a mechanism with value equal to V (0), or equivalently,
that g (0) is not empty. Without loss of generality, suppose the range of v is [0;1]. Consider the set
H = f(;z) 2 hyp(V )jz  0g. Since ^ v is upper semicontinuous, H is compact. By construction
of V , H is convex. Therefore, by Choquet's Theorem (e.g., Phelps 2001), for any (0;z0) 2 H,
there exists a probability measure  s.t. (0;z0) =
R
H (;z)d (;z) with  supported by extreme
points of H. In particular, there exists  s.t. (0;V (0)) =
R
H (;z)d (;z) with  supported
by extreme points of H: Now, note that if (;z) is an extreme point of H, then V () = ^ v ();
moreover, if z > 0, z = V () = ^ v (). Hence, we can nd an  s.t. (0;V (0)) =
R
H (;z)d (;z)
with support of  entirely within f(; ^ v ())j 2 (
)g. Therefore, there exists a  2 g (0).
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